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The Rothschild Consortium and the State Debt  
of  the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
György Kövér
Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest
kover.gyorgy@btk.elte.hu
The state debts of  the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy after 1867 consisted of  three 
parts: loans acquired before 1867; loans acquired by the Cisleithanian half  of  the 
empire after the Compromise of  1867; and, finally, new state debt generated by the 
Kingdom of  Hungary also after 1867. Between 1873 and 1910, with some exceptions, 
it was the Rothschild–Creditanstalt–Disconto-Gesellschaft consortium that acted 
in the role of  the state banker in both halves of  the dualistic state. The decision in 
favor of  the Rothschilds was based not only on their extensive international network, 
rapid communications, immense prestige, an enormous amount of  capital and a high 
degree of  competitiveness but on the fact that they had long been heavily involved 
in Austrian financial affairs and in their quasi-monopoly position were able to assess 
relatively favorable costs. While the international market treated Hungary’s state bonds 
as the public debt of  a sovereign state, it still considered Austria and Hungary to be 
economically interdependent parts of  the same, albeit politically dual, monarchy even as 
the threat of  the dualist state’s dissolution emerged more and more frequently from the 
turn of  the century onwards. After initial hardships, yields on Hungary’s state debt with 
some lag were able to keep up with the profitability on the again gradually increasing 
Austrian state debt. 
Keywords: Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, State debt, Rothschild–Creditanstalt–
Disconto-Gesellschaft consortium, reputation, “empire effect”, “Rothschild effect” 
Empires have written themselves back into history. Such a statement can now 
be confidently made not only because of  the post-colonial turn in writing 
history or the empire-building aspirations that we currently witness, but also 
because of  the ongoing large-scale reevaluation of  the history of  past empires. 
In historiography, the Eastern European empires of  the nineteenth century 
are no longer seen as entities predestined to dissolve, even though this is what 
was taught to several generations of  students after World War I.1 The view that 
there is, in fact, no diametrical opposition between the ability of  the empires 
to renew themselves and the nation-building processes that emerge within the 
framework of  those empires seems to be gaining an impressive foothold.2 Even 
1  Kövér, “Centripetal and Centrifugal Economic Forces.” 
2  Berger and Miller, “Introduction: Building Nations.” 
HHR_2018-2_KÖNYV.indb   250 9/18/2018   9:56:10 AM
The Rothschild Consortium and the State Debt of  the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
251
those scholars who study the Ottoman Empire, a textbook example of  slow, 
drawn-out erosion, now emphasize the modern nature and the effectiveness of  
its sweeping imperial reforms.
However, the study of  the “empire effect” has generated serious controversy 
with regard to the five decades leading up to World War I.3 In fact, economists and 
economic historians analyzing more or less similar data series have arrived at widely 
diverging conclusions. Of  course, there have been differences both in terms of  
the size of  the databases and the econometric methods applied, yet it is difficult 
to accept that scholars should arrive at diametrically opposed conclusions in 
evaluating the impact of  any given country’s status as a colony in terms of  its access 
to international money markets—in other words, in resolving the issue of  whether 
colonies (without making a distinction between the colonies of  white settlers and 
other types of  colonies) were offered more favorable terms than sovereign states 
when acquiring loans in the London money-market.4 When examining the issue 
not so much from the perspective of  the colonies, but from that of  the various 
sovereign states entering the money markets on very different terms, yet another 
question arises: did investors in actual fact apply the same criteria in assessing 
colonies and sovereign states? For in the case of  colonies, empirical guarantees 
proved to be a much more important factor than any financial parameter.5
The shift we see in the historical evaluation of  the Habsburg Danubian 
empire is quite spectacular even though various scholars may not offer converging 
interpretations or may not necessarily, or fully, consider the quantitative results 
available in the context of  these newly arising questions.6 What’s more, similar 
inquiries into the key parameters of  Austrian and Hungarian government finance 
have shown that those parameters hardly exerted any “consistent and robust 
impact on the yields of  state bonds.”7
* * *
From the perspective of  the empire, the state debts of  the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy after 1867 consisted of  three distinct parts: loans acquired before 
3  Ferguson, “Political Risk;” Ferguson and Schularlik, “The Empire Effect;” Accominotti, Flandreau, 
and Rezzik, “The Spread of  Empire.”
4  Ferguson and Schularlik, “The Empire Effect.”
5  Accominotti, Flandreau, and Rezzik, “The Spread of  Empire.” 
6  Komlosy, “Imperial Cohesion.”
7  Pammer, “The Hungarian Risk,” 37.
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1867; loans acquired by the Cisleithanian half  of  the empire after the Austro-
Hungarian Compromise of  1867; and, finally, new state debt generated by the 
Kingdom of  Hungary also after 1867. The first of  these might, in effect, be 
called the “common debt” of  the Monarchy—then again, this terminology 
would certainly contradict the official Hungarian position, which claimed that, 
in the context of  public law, such debts were generated without Hungarian 
consent, therefore Hungary could not be held accountable for their repayment. 
However, as reflected in the wording of  Hungary’s acts on the Austro-Hungarian 
Compromise of  1867, the Hungarian party, “out of  fairness and political 
considerations,” was willing to contribute to the repayment of  such debt to an 
agreed extent, in fact applying the so-called principle of  praecipuum in the actual 
calculations. In other words, the Hungarian government agreed to make partial 
interest payments with respect to a principal amount that it never acknowledged 
as its own debt. Then again, this was not the only public-law absurdity in the 
Dual Monarchy.
Let us set the Hungarian public-law position aside for the time being and 
consider the following graph, which plots the Dual Monarchy’s state debt:
Graph 1. Austro-Hungarian State Debt (1867–1913)
Source: Clemens Jobst and Thomas Scheiber, “Austria-Hungary from 1863 to 1914,” in South-Eastern 
European Monetary and Economic Statistics from the Nineteenth Century to World War II (South-Eastern European 
Monetary History Network) (Athens, Sofia, Bucharest and Vienna: Bank of  Greece, Bulgarian National 
Bank, National Bank of  Romania, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, 2014), 97.
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As a result of  the reduction of  the interest rate and the introduction of  
the coupon tax in 1868, the pre-1867, so-called “common debt” temporarily 
decreased. During the period leading up to the war of  1877–78, the “common 
debt” exceptionally increased once again, more or less reaching earlier levels. 
However, from this period on, the “common debt” remained practically 
unchanged, although it would be more accurate to say that it showed a slightly 
decreasing trend. After the Compromise of  1867, the two state parties—the 
two halves of  the empire, Cisleithania (Austria) and Transleithania (Hungary)—
had access to government loans as separate sovereign states. As a result of  the 
situation that emerged after 1868, the Cisleithanian part of  the empire had no 
access to new loans (the London Stock Exchange barred the trading of  Austrian 
loans, and trading in Hungarian state debt had only been possible at a premium 
payable on top of  the Austrian debts to begin with).8 This means that Hungary, 
entering first to the London Stock Exchange in 1872, had not only to overcome 
the difficulties of  a newcomer, but also to cover the costs of  the Austrian coupon 
tax on foreign bonds.9 The correspondence of  the Austrian Minister-President 
Friedrich Beust and the head of  the Paris House of  Rothschild banking family, 
James de Rothschild, precisely reflects the basic structure of  the debtor-versus-
borrower game situation.10 James de Rothschild expressed his firm critical 
opinion; however finally—in contrast to the London Stock Exchange—the Paris 
Bourse did not exclude the Austrian bonds from the quotation list. At the same 
time the question increased the tensions among the branches of  the Rothschild 
family, especially between Vienna and Paris.11
8  Kövér, “The London Stock Market,” 168–69. Hungary’s finance ministry contracted the financial 
group of  the Erlangers in an effort to circumvent Vienna and the Rothschilds. On the Erlangers, see 
Chapman, The Rise of  Merchant Banking, 85–86.
9  In his estimations on the risk premium of  newcomers, Michael Tomz does not take Hungary into 
consideration, presumably because the Hungarian five-percent bond was issued in London by Raphael 
and Sons only in 1872. Tomz, Reputation and International Cooperation, 59–60. The nominal interest rate 
was 5 percent, the issue price 81, so the yield (6.17 percent) was considerably below the average yields of  
newcomers at that time (8.6 percent). Clarke, “On the Debts of  Sovereign,” 317–18. On Raphaels Bank, 
see Chapman, Raphael Bicentenary 1787–1987. 
10  “Ich hoffe, daß Sie uns ein wenig mit ihren Rathschlägen un mit Ihrem Einfluß unterstützen werden.” 
Friedrich Beust to James de Rothschild, May 28, 1868. Quote from Corti, Das Haus Rothschild, 434. James 
Rothschild, in one of  his last letters (he died in November 1868), explained his position: “Je comprends 
parfaitement qu’aujourd’hui l’Autriche veuille établir son budget sur les revenues du pays et non sur 
l’emprunt, mais ce serait tomber dans une exagération regrettable que de répudier absolument pour l’avenir 
le système des emprunts.” James de Rothschild to Friedrich Beust, June 2, 1868. Quote from Gille, Histoire 
de la Maison Rothschild, vol. 2, 486. 
11  Ferguson, The World’s Banker, 690.
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It is a fact that with the exception of  the years immediately leading up to World 
War I, the state debt of  the Austrian Hereditary Lands significantly lagged behind 
the indebtedness levels of  the Kingdom of  Hungary. Enjoying limited sovereignty, 
the Hungarian state made every effort after 1867 to make up for what it had missed 
out on due to having lost its own war of  independence: during the period between 
1849 and the Compromise of  1867, Hungary had not been in a position to issue its 
own sovereign debt. Plotting the rate of  Hungarian sovereign debt accumulation in 
this first stage generates an unusually steep curve practically until the early 1890s, 
the second half  of  the 1880s being the only interim period showing some degree 
of  self-restraint. Then, for about two decades around the turn of  the century, 
Hungarian sovereign debt barely increased at all, or only at a very modest rate. 
In turn, the half  decade leading up to World War I brought rapid sovereign debt 
accumulation both in Cisleithania and in Transleithania, although by this period the 
Austrian Hereditary Lands were by far in the lead. 
Reviewing Austria’s and Hungary’s state debt curves in parallel, it is not 
a challenge to notice how the two move in close coordination. From the 
beginning of  the 1870s and into the middle of  the 1880s, the dynamic of  
Hungarian sovereign debt accumulation was, as it were, balanced out—one 
might be tempted to say, supported from the background—by Austria’s own 
self-restraint and stability. Then in the second half  of  the 1880s, the slowing 
rate of  Hungarian sovereign debt accumulation was offset by the increasing 
rate of  Austrian sovereign debt accumulation. At the turn of  the decade, the 
dynamics changed again: while Austria’s accumulation of  sovereign debt lost its 
momentum, this was compensated for by the dizzying rate at which Hungary’s 
own sovereign debt started to increase. Then, from the period following the 
currency reform, Cisleithania’s sovereign debt accumulation took center stage 
once again. Of  course, one could interpret this contrapuntal game of  sovereign 
debt accumulation rates as a manifestation of  the harmonious cooperation 
between the two state parties involved, although with some understanding of  
the nature of  the relations between Austria and Hungary at the turn of  the 
century, this would be hardly credible. Not discarding this option entirely, the 
linkage between sovereign debt accumulation dynamics of  the two states may 
well be rooted somewhere else. In observing the turnover of  the securities 
(mostly through focusing on the interests paid), we have seen the two states 
as the main—almost only—protagonists. However, there was yet another main 
protagonist in the context of  the debts of  the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 
namely, the Rothschild–Creditanstalt–Dictonto-Gesellschaft consortium, the 
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gateway through which the state bonds of  the Dual Monarchy gained access 
to the global international money market. Between 1873 and 1910, with some 
exceptions, it was this consortium that acted in the role of  the state banker 
in both halves of  the dualistic state: it offered short-term bridge loans as well 
as what were called long-term consolidated government loans. It is therefore 
a good idea to take a brief  look at the behavior of  the issuing consortium in 
relation to the Austrian and Hungarian bonds. 
Published sources in financial statistics allow us to rely on fairly accurate data as 
to where Hungarian state bonds were placed throughout the years.12 The available 
data is based on the annual interest payments made by Hungary’s Ministry of  
Finance. Despite the fact that coupons paid in Vienna or Paris do not necessarily 
belong to Austrian or French investors, this is the data series that literature has 
tacitly used to illustrate the countries from which the foreign capital financing 
Hungary’s state debt originated. In fact, it does largely reflect the main trends, but 
it may be wise to consider that the data series reflects not so much states as, rather, 
currency zones. Whether the coupons were paid in Paris, Berlin or London was 
more a function of  the agio or disagio of  the franc, the mark, or the pound sterling 
against the Austrian currency (especially before 1892, the year in which the empire 
adopted the Austro-Hungarian krone as its official currency).
Graph 2. The Territorial Distribution of  Holders of  Hungarian State Securities as Reflected in 
the Place of  Coupon Payment (1868–1914)
Sources: Fellner, Die Zahlungsbilanz Ungarns, Statement III; Fellner, “Das Volkseinkommen Österreich und 
Ungarn,” Table VII.
12  Fellner, Die Zahlungsbilanz Ungarns; Idem, “Das Volkseinkommen Österreich und Ungarn.”
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The graph clearly indicates how in the initial stage, during the 1870s, the 
Viennese money market played a relatively modest role in financing the Hungarian 
state debt. The proportion of  Austrian bond holders started to increase from 
the 1880s and peaked during the first half  of  the 1890s; during this same period, 
the proportion of  Hungarian investors stagnated and even decreased. The turn 
of  the century ushered in a new era when investors from abroad (i.e., from 
outside the Dual Monarchy) and the Hungarian capital market jointly absorbed 
the overwhelming majority of  the Hungarian state debt.
The Monarchy’s state bond market consciously took advantage of  the 
fragmentation of  the international capital market. It issued state bonds 
denominated either in gold or in gold currencies specifically for the international 
money markets, while its securities denominated in the Austrian bank currency 
were issued mostly for resident investors. It is possible to track the journey 
of  the various securities one by one from their placement all the way to their 
payment, but this would go far beyond the limitations of  this article. For this 
very reason, we will now focus primarily on trends in the issue and interest 
payment of  the so-called Austrian and Hungarian four-percent gold rentes and 
the Austrian and Hungarian five-percent paper rentes especially with regard to 
the period when the monarchy implemented its currency reform and launched 
its rente conversion program. 
Both the Austrian and Hungarian four-percent gold rentes were denominated 
in gold forints; accordingly, they were linked to the money markets of  the gold 
currency countries through the gold forint exchange rate (the official exchange 
rates being 100 gold forints = 250 francs = 200 marks = 10 pounds sterling). 
Bond issues were strictly tailored to the needs and possibilities of  the international 
capital market. The Austrian Hereditary Lands issued such denominations from 
1876, with Hungary following suit in 1880. Already in 1876, partly because of  
the earlier unification and interest rate reduction, the Cisleithanian lands could 
reenter the international capital market offering four-percent rentes; in turn, 
Hungary’s financial situation at the time only allowed the issue of  six-percent 
gold rentes, and it was only at the beginning of  the 1880s that Hungary, too, 
could switch to four-percent gold rentes.
From 1876 until the end of  the 1880s, Austria acquired loans in the amount 
of  340,850,000 gold forints by issuing gold rentes; during the decade of  the 
1880s, Hungary’s total sovereign debt denominated in this type of  security 
amounted to 592,000,000 gold forints. During the 1880s, both state parties also 
issued five-percent paper rentes to cover their capital requirements, primarily 
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targeting domestic investors looking for opportunities to place their savings. 
During the 1880s, the Austrian state issued five-percent paper rentes in a total 
nominal value of  238,877,100 forints, while the Hungarian state’s bond issues 
amounted to a total nominal value of  358,487,000 forints.13 As can be seen from 
these figures, the Hungarian party’s capital needs were significantly higher in 
the case of  both types of  rente bonds. In the case of  paper rente, at the time 
of  the first issue, both governments made attempts to contract other consortia 
(in Vienna, Julian Dunajewski contacted the Länderbank group, while in Pest 
Gyula Szapáry entered negotiations with a consortium led by the Union-bank of  
Vienna), but eventually both found their way back to the consortium belonging 
to the Rothschilds, whom they inevitably needed anyway when it came to the 
issuance of  gold rentes. This clearly shows how closely interrelated the various 
rentes were, not only in terms of  the issuing government (Austria or Hungary), 
but also in terms of  their denomination (gold forints versus paper forints).
Already during the second half  of  the 1870s, Austrian four-percent gold 
rente prices and Hungarian six-percent gold rente prices were closely interrelated. 
In a letter written to the management of  Creditanstalt and discussing, among 
other things, the issue of  the second tranche, Adolph von Hansemann, general 
manager of  Berlin-based Disconto-Gesellschaft, went as far as making the 
following—quite straightforward—statement: “as soon as the Austrian gold 
rente appreciates to 61 percent [. . .] time will have come to issue the Hungarian 
gold rente.”14
From the time of  its very birth, the Hungarian four-percent gold rente was 
in the limelight of  both the domestic and international press. A wide range of  
factors were put forward in an effort to explain the success of  the May 1881 
issue of  the rente, the improvement in Hungary’s finances being evidently one 
of  the more reasonable explanations. At the same time, many were quick to 
comment that while the finances of  Hungary were in fact improving, its deficit 
levels remained unchanged, “without much of  a guarantee for the country’s 
political future.” The fact of  the matter is that subscribers “put their confidence 
in the Messrs. Rothschild rather than in Hungary, and, generally speaking have 
13  Statistische Tabellen, 316–18; A valuta-ügyre vonatkozó statisztikai adatok, 106–14; Kövér, “A bécsi 
Rothschildok.”
14  “Wenn die Österreichische Gold Rente auf  61% geht, wird allgemein sich das Gefühl Bahn brechen, 
daß der richtige Zeitpunkt für die Emission der Ungarische Goldrente zugekommen sein wird.” A. v. 
Hansemann – CA, Berlin, 7 Jun 1877. 7. Rothschild Archive, London (hereafter RAL) 637 – 1 – 45.
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no intention to hold what may be allotted them, but hope to sell at a premium.”15 
Even those voicing their indignation or bewilderment about this state of  the 
affairs had to come to grips with the fact that Austrian and Hungarian securities 
were valued differently, even though the difference in their valuation decreased 
somewhat over time.16 Even in the very last stage of  converting six-percent rentes 
into four-percent rentes, press commentaries always tried to offer some sort of  a 
rational explanation with respect to the price-level differences between Austrian 
and Hungarian securities, even though they could only guess the probability of  
any given future development.17
15  The Statist, May 20, 1881.
16  Contemporary commentators remained puzzled about the price difference for quite some time. 
“Perusing the official stock exchange listings, one cannot but sadly note that Hungarian state securities 
are underpriced by 5% as compared to Austrian state securities. The reasons for this phenomenon are 
truly beyond explanation and may root in the circumstance that European markets have been familiar with 
Austrian government issues for longer than they have been with Hungarian government issues. They have 
forgotten about the coercive levying of  taxes on coupons and financial gains.” The author of  this quote, 
József  Steiner, believed such market attitude was “comical and frivolous” in light of  the fact that “the 
Hungarian state offered more guarantees in each and every respect.” “Államadósságok szaporítása” [The 
increase in state debt], Magyar Pénzügy, April 16, 1882. The decrease in the price gap did not serve to mitigate 
the perplexity either: “While the most recent price changes significantly decreased the price gap between 
Hungarian and Austrian rentes, it nevertheless remains quite wide; by now, any difference whatsoever can 
only be seen as political absurdity and financial injustice [. . .] costing the state millions year after year.” “A 
magyar államhitel alakulása” [The trend in Hungarian state loans], Magyar Pénzügy, May 2, 1889.
17  “It should be borne in mind that although separate accounts are kept of  the finances of  Hungary, 
as distinguished from those of  Austria, yet both are equally under the auspices of  the same Imperial-
Royal Government of  Austro-Hungary, and the security for each is ultimately identical. Consequently, 
there is no reason why there should be so great a difference in the market value of  the Austrian Four per 
cents and those of  Hungary, except that the latter are not yet placed. It is not at all improbable that when 
the Hungarian Sixes are all withdrawn, and the Fours all absorbed, that the latter will take rank with the 
Austrian 4-s, now quoted at 86. Those, therefore, who get into the Hungarian Fours at the price of  75, may 
before long have good reason to congratulate themselves on their pluck and foresight.” “The Hungarian 
Debt Conversion,” The Statist, March 29, 1884.
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Average Price Profitability*
4% Austrian 4% Hungarian 4% Austrian 4% Hungarian
1876 **70.80 6.79
1877 73.90 6.62
1878 72.93 6.43
1879 78.64 5.91
1880 87.59 5.33
1881 93.40 90.74 5.00 5.10
1882 94.41 87.29 5.03 5.40
1883 98.69 87.94 4.82 5.40
1884 102.66 92.20 4.71 5.20
1885 108.27 97.90 4.56 5.00
1886 115.60 104.57 4.32 4.70
1887 111.44 100.04 4.49 5.00
1888 110.18 99.43 4.46 4.90
1889 109.98 101.45 4.31 4.60
1890 108.50 102.43 4.25 4.50
1891 109.93 104.46 4.22 4.40
1892 113.28 4.19
* Profits calculated according to the annual average of  the gold agio.
** First issued on December 22, 1876.
Table 1. A. The Annual Average Price and Profitability of  Austrian and Hungarian Gold Rentes
Average Price Profitability (Yields)
5% Austrian 5% Hungarian 5% Austrian 5% Hungarian
1881 95.48 88.35 5.24 5.6
1882 91.48 86.28 5.46 5.7
1883 93.20 86.59 5.36 5.7
1884 95.81 88.76 5.22 5.6
1885 98.98 91.03 5.05 5.4
1886 101.52 94.45 4.92 5.2
1887 96.26 87.83 5.19 5.7
1888 95.54 88.04 5.23 5.6
1889 99.99 95.79 5.00 5.2
1890 101.63 99.55 4.92 5.02
1891 102.09 101.22 4.90 4.93
1892* 101.14 4.94
Table 1. B. The Annual Average Price and Profitability of  Austrian and Hungarian Paper Rentes
* After the decision concerning bond conversion(s).
Sources: Statistische Tabellen zur Währungs-Frage der Österreich-Ungarischen Monarchie, 306; Tabellen zur Währungs-
Statistik (Vienna, 1893), 253; A valuta-ügyre vonatkozó statisztikai adatok, 115.
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Economic history literature has also dedicated a lot of  attention to the 
question of  the price difference between Austrian and Hungarian state securities 
(and the moderation of  such difference around the time of  the currency 
reform) through the work of  authors such as John Komlos, Marc Flandreau, 
and, most recently, Michael Pammer.18 The quantitative analysis carried out has 
helped discard many factors that had been given serious consideration earlier, 
when the discourse on these issues had been still mostly based on guesswork. 
However, some archival sources, such as, first and foremost, the correspondence 
between the banking and finance houses of  the Rothschilds still offer further 
opportunities. In addition to highlighting the asymmetrical nature of  the 
relationship between the Rothschild consortium and the Austrian and Hungarian 
governments, they also reflect the conflict and rivalry characterizing the internal 
life of  the consortium. As a typical episode manifesting such rivalry, we might 
mention the apprehensions of  the Rothschilds of  Vienna about how the Berlin 
banks and especially A. Hansemann, general manager of  Disconto-Gesellschaft, 
aspired to gain a leading role in the transactions; they were of  the opinion that in 
issues of  currency regulation and gold procurement, London and Vienna should 
be granted exclusive leadership. At the same time, they had no doubts about the 
fact that, when it comes to loan negotiations, the finance ministers of  Austria 
and Hungary would favor the Rothschild consortium over any other financial 
group.19 In a much broader sense than it was originally used by Flandreau and 
Flores we could speak about a “Rothschild effect.”20
Throughout the period, the primary target of  Austrian gold rente issues was 
increasingly Germany (by 1898, Germany’s total share reached 60 percent). The 
French money market played a significant role initially, but its share gradually 
dwindled away, with German investors moving in to take over;21 Belgium and 
18  Komlos, The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union, 173–84; Flandreau, “The Logic of  compromise”; 
Pammer, “The Hungarian Risk,” 23–52.
19  RAL 637 – 2 – 3. Albert Rothschild, Wien – NMR, London, 29 Jan 1892.
20  The authors distinguish “clean” state bond issues from “tainted” ones. “For new clean bonds the 
Rothschilds’ yield premia are about 300 basis points lower than average for the category. This is an enormous 
effect: the Rothschilds could bring new borrowers to the market at very attractive terms. Seasoned tainted 
issues when they were taken in by the Rothschilds also enjoy a reduction of  100 basis points, meaning 
that prestige could restore credit.” Flandreau and. Flores, “The Peaceful Conspiracy: Bond Markets and 
International Relations During the Pax Britannica,” 226.
21  On the “relative stagnation and depression” in French Current Account balance between 1882 
and 1897, see the following classic work: Cameron, France and the Economic Development of  Europe, 79–82. 
On the political and economic motives that impelled the withdrawal of  French capital, see Ránki, “Le 
capital français en Hongrie.” Earlier the political explanation was dominant in the French capital export 
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movements, although currently the rationality of  investor decision-making has regained its appropriate 
role among the arguments. Parent and Rault, “The Influence Affecting French Assets;” Le Bris, “Why Did 
French Savers Buy Foreign Assets.”
Graph 3. Changes in the Territorial Distribution of  Austrian and Hungarian Four-Percent 
Gold Rente Coupon Payments Made in International Money Markets (1886–1898)
Sources: Statistische Tabellen zur Währungs-Frage der Österreich-Ungarischen Monarchie; Tabellen zur Währungs-
Statistik, 1893; Tabellen zur Währungs-Statistik, 2nd edition, 2nd part (Vienna, 1900–1904); A valuta-ügyre 
vonatkozó statisztikai adatok, 1891; A valuta-ügyre vonatkozó statisztikai adatok (1892–1901) (manuscript) 
(Budapest, Hungarian Royal Finance Ministry, 1904).
Austria Hungary
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Switzerland, in turn, never held significant amounts. In the meantime, the 
proportion of  Austrian bondholders increased from one-fifth to one-fourth. 
During the 1890s, Austrian capital carved out a dynamically increasing share 
for itself  among Hungarian four-percent gold rente holders; here, it was the 
Austrians who took over the role of  the quickly retreating French bondholders. 
It may be worth mentioning that there was no change in the proportion of  
Hungarian gold rentes held by Germans, British, or Hungarians during the 
period. Consequently, taking a look at changes in the placement of  Austrian and 
Hungarian four-percent gold rentes in parallel, we can conclude that while French 
bond holders pulled out of  the bond markets of  both governments, those who 
entered these markets in their place were primarily German investors in the case 
of  Austria and Austrian investors in the case of  Hungary. In other words, the 
increase in the share of  Austrian investors in Hungary was mostly made possible 
by the placement of  Austrian securities in Germany (the crowding-out effect).
A look at where Hungarian five-percent paper rente coupon payments were 
made around the turn of  the 1880s and 1890s also offers interesting lessons. It may 
be worth adding that in the case of  this type of  security, the Hungarian finance 
minister placed special emphasis on making sure that the largest possible portion 
of  the securities were held by Hungarian investors. Not even the banks’ archives 
allow us to reconstruct the sale of  paper rentes in a fully detailed fashion, but it 
seems to be beyond any doubt that sales in Hungary showed a declining trend. In 
1882, as much as 45 percent to 47 percent of  the securities were sold in Hungary; 
by 1887, the rate dropped to less than 30 percent, with sales in Austria ramping up 
to over 60 percent.22 All this occurred despite the fact that the Hungarian member 
of  the consortium, the General Credit Bank of  Hungary, increased its own share 
from ten percent in 1882 to eleven percent in 1887. When negotiations started 
about the 14th issue in 1887, and the minutes of  Credit Bank’s board of  directors 
meeting recorded the fixed-price takeover of  a package of  five-percent paper 
rentes in a total nominal value of  23,000,000 forints, the following comment was 
made nearly routinely: “Our participation is eleven percent, although we transfer 
two percent of  the entire transaction to financial institutions with whom we are 
closely affiliated.”23 On the day of  closing the transaction, the head of  the Vienna 
22  RAL 637 – 1 – 46-51. See Kövér, A bécsi Rothschildok, 148.
23  Hungarian National Archive State Archive (hereafter MNL OL) Z 50 9. cs. 3. t. MÁH igazgató 
tanács jk. April 25, 1887. On the very same occasion, under the next agenda item, it was decided that 
the consortium would take over Austrian five-percent paper rentes in the amount of  24 million forints. 
Hitelbank had a share of  six percent in this package. Ibid.
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Rothschilds sent off  first a telegram and then a detailed letter to his cousins in 
Paris informing them about the terms of  the deal: a package of  Hungarian paper 
rentes in a total nominal value of  23 million forints was to be taken over at a fixed 
price of  85¾ (the quoted daily price being 88¾). He did not believe that a public 
subscription would be necessary; however, the bonds became available over the 
counter (Schalterwege) in Vienna, Pest, and Berlin the very same day. Negotiations 
with the Austrian finance minister also started the very same week.24 The option for 
the next tranche arising from the contracts was formulated by Creditanstalt’s board 
of  directors in even greater unison under the brief  title Consortien für Oesterreichische 
und Ungarische Papierrente.25 
24  RAL 637 – 1 – 50 S. M. Rothschild – Rothschild frères, Vienna, March 28, 1887. (Curiously, the letter 
is addressed to “Meine lieben Vettern.”)
25  The matter discussed was taking over Austrian Märzrente in the amount of  six million forints and 
Hungarian paper rentes in the amount of  five million forints. BA-CA, CA-V, CA – Verwaltungsrath-
Protokoll vom 24 Mai 1887.
Graph 4
The Territorial Distribution of  Hungarian Five-Percent Paper Rente Coupon Payments 
(Austrian Forint Currency, Percent)
Source: A valuta-ügyre vonatkozó statisztikai adatok (Budapest, 1891), 80–86; Tabellen zur 
Währungs-Statistik, 2nd edition, 2nd part (Vienna, 1900–1904). 466, 484.
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However, financial statistics on coupon payment suggest that Hungary held 
on to its share of  44 percent to 46 percent in 1886 as well as in 1890, and 
that, in fact, the proportion of  Hungarian investors increased to 63 percent by 
1892 (while the proportion of  Austrian investors dropped to less than one-third 
just before the conversion of  the paper rentes). The scarce statistical data we 
have on the coupon payment of  Austrian paper rentes seems to indicate that all 
payments were made in Austria, even though this is somewhat difficult to believe 
in the light of  the aforesaid. What may have happened at most is that certain old 
views lingered on within the system of  financial statistics, treating the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy as a unified entity in this respect.26
As far as the Austrian gold rente strategy of  the Vienna Rothschilds is 
concerned, the stock book itemizes, at best, certain occasional purchase or sale 
transactions related to high or increasing price levels or designed to influence 
price levels on an ad hoc basis. In the long run, they expected Hungarian gold 
rente prices to increase. They gradually increased their stock in this type of  bond 
as prices rose, and when price levels peaked, they sold off  an overwhelming part 
of  the stock of  bonds they had held. Also noteworthy is to what extent their 
expectations depended on international arbitrage; this link is clearly demonstrated 
not only by the fact that they kept bonds on deposit with Bleichröder but also by 
their speculation on the Berlin parity.
In terms of  strategy, the strongest similarities are seen between Hungarian 
gold rentes and Hungarian paper rentes, even though in the case of  the latter, 
expectations focused not on selling the paper rentes, but specifically on their 
conversion into krone rentes. However, the price difference between Austrian 
and Hungarian state bond issues never entirely disappeared even after transition 
to the krone.27
It seems especially worthy of  our attention that the prices of  the Austrian 
and Hungarian state bond issues remained interlinked even after the Rothschild 
consortium lost its monopolistic position in Cisleithania as far as Austrian 
26  Imperial and Royal Finance Ministry, Tabellen zur Währungs-Statistik, 276–77. Referencing Ottomar 
Haupt, another source understands that the placement of  Austrian paper rentes showed the following 
distribution: Austria, 81 percent; Hungary, 9 percent; and third countries, 10 percent. Flandreau, “The 
Logic of  Compromise,” 17.*
27  The fear of  the Monarchy’s dissolution is analyzed as a political factor from various points of  view and 
using various methods in Flandreau, “The Logic of  Compromise,” 14–19, and Pammer, “The Hungarian 
Risk,” 40–43.
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state bonds were concerned.28 One way to interpret this is that the influence 
that the Rothschild consortium retained on Hungarian state bonds even after 
Albert’s death provided additional safeguards against any major diversion 
from the internationally accepted terms. It would therefore appear that while 
the international market treated Hungary’s state bonds as the public debt of  a 
sovereign state29 (there seems to exist no other worthwhile explanation as to why 
the price difference, moderating at times but always reappearing, persisted), it 
still considered Austria and Hungary to be economically interdependent parts of  
the same, albeit politically dual, monarchy even as the threat of  the dualist state’s 
dissolution emerged more and more frequently from the turn of  the century 
onwards. The influence wielded by the Rothschild consortium certainly played a 
supporting role in ensuring that neither of  the constituent states of  the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy went bankrupt.
* * *
Customarily, there are a number of  relative indicators in use to measure the rate 
of  the sovereign debt of  Austria and Hungary: the sovereign debt expressed in 
absolute terms is taken in relation to the size of  the population (public debt per 
capita) or to the rate of  GDP growth (on the basis of  Max Schulze’s data),30 
while Marc Flandreau analyzed interest burden data in the light of  government 
revenues.31
This latter method of  calculation has its own difficulties. For one, in order 
to establish the actual amount of  interests paid, the contribution paid by both 
Austria and Hungary towards their “common debt” must also be considered. 
It must also be mentioned that Austria and Hungary followed very different 
practical standards when recording the revenues and expenditures of  state 
companies for the purposes of  public finance accounting.32
28  Michel, Banques et banquiers en Autriche, 127–35. The overall picture is too complicated to allow any 
oversimplification of  the process as a one-way-street or cul-de-sac. Cf. Ferguson, The World’s Banker, 935–38.
29  Flandreau, “The Logic of  Compromise,” 18.
30  Pammer, “The Hungarian Risk,” 32–37.
31  Flandreau, “The Logic of  Compromise.”
32  Eddie, “Limits on the Fiscal Independence.” 
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Graph 5 a-b. Austrian and Hungarian Debt Service and Government Revenues (1875–1912)  
in Millions of  Forints
Source: Flandreau, “The Logic of  Compromise,” 31.
In the Austrian Hereditary Lands—which bore the brunt of  paying back the 
“common state debt”—the debt-service ratio fluctuated by around one-fourth 
during the 1870s and all the way through the 1890s. It was only successfully 
decreased to a level lower than one-fifth around the turn of  the century. By 
1912, right before World War I, it was under 15 percent. Referencing Graph 1 
once again, this was obviously only possible due to the fact that government 
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revenues increased much more dynamically than the country’s debt service, and 
as Table 3 allows us to conclude, there was no deterioration in the terms of  issue 
of  state bonds. During the 1870s and the 1880s, Hungary’s debt-service ratio 
hovered around one-third, and it was only pushed under the critical threshold 
of  30 percent around 1890. However, the debt burden slowly but surely grew 
in both halves of  the empire. In Hungary, annual government revenue levels 
varied wildly around the turn of  the century, primarily because of  poor crops 
and years of  economic crisis. Consequently, the relative burden of  the country’s 
debt service was never lower than one-fifth until after 1906, although by 1912—
just as in Austria—it was lower than the 15-percent threshold. Thus, during the 
1890s—after an ominous start, in the wake of  its currency reform and debt 
conversions—the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy finally broke out of  the zone 
(a debt service ratio of  over 25 percent) that was typical of  heavily indebted 
states.33 And this is where the Rothschild consortium’s role in debt consolidation 
merits more of  our attention among other factors pertaining to the international 
money market.
The credit that a state can obtain on the international money market depends 
on several factors. Recent economic, economic-history and even international 
political-science analyses have placed particular significance on the role that the 
reputation of  an indebted country plays in determining its creditworthiness. 
The reputation of  a country is based not only on its past, that is, whether it 
has previously taken out loans, whether it has repaid loans promptly or has 
perhaps become insolvent (or asked for rescheduling of  its debt), but on the 
estimation of  whether under exceptional circumstances (natural catastrophe, 
war, economic crisis, etc.) it will prove capable and inclined to maintain 
its solvency. It is important to be familiar with the motives of  the creditors 
(bankers and investors) in each given situation: the information they possess 
when evaluating requests for credit; the network of  connections and amount 
of  capital that capital-market players have at their disposal, the degree to which 
they are committed to participating in the transaction (are they trying to cut their 
losses as the result of  endangered previous engagements, are they going after 
their money?). The standing of  an indebted country in the international money-
market hierarchy determines its position—its degree of  access to the primary 
market centers (which in the nineteenth century were London and Paris). 
33  Accominotti, Flandreau, and Rezzik, “The Spread of  Empire,” 401.
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The Austrian Empire had the reputation as a bad debtor already before 
the Compromise of  1867. The decision of  the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 
1868 to unify and convert the banknotes in which its debt was denominated and 
to introduce a coupon tax in the interest of  stabilizing its state finances served 
to further impair this reputation. The aforesaid measures cast a shadow upon 
Hungary as well just as the country was entering the international market. The 
semi-sovereign Hungarian state claimed in vain that the so-called “old debts” had 
been accrued without its consent and that it thus had no debts of  its own, since 
potential creditors did not have a positive historical judgement of  its behavior 
as a debtor and it even seemed to be conceivable that the state could declare 
insolvency at any time. Indeed, the Transleithanian half  of  the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy began to accumulate sovereign debt so rapidly that it was nearly forced 
into sovereign default in 1873. The commitment of  Hungary to the Rothschild–
Creditanstalt–Disconto-Gesellschaft consortium played a decisive role in averting 
such default. The decision in favor of  the Rothschilds was based not only on 
their extensive international network, rapid communications, immense prestige, 
enormous amount of  capital and high degree of  competitiveness, but on the 
fact that they had long been heavily involved in Austrian financial affairs and in 
their quasi–monopoly position were able to assess relatively favorable costs.34 
Cisleithania, however, was forced under its post-1868 financial circumstances 
to refrain from rapidly accruing debt and, in fact, assumed the role of  creditor 
within the internal market of  the Dual Monarchy. However, the influence of  
the Rothschilds was not unlimited: for example, they attempted for almost a 
half  century to rescue Spain from insolvency, though when the country’s debt 
was nevertheless rescheduled in the 1870s, they withdrew from the Spanish 
government-bond market and sought—and found—compensation in various 
enterprises (railway and mining).35 By contrast, after initial hardships, yields on 
Hungary’s state debt with some lag were able to keep up with the profitability 
on the again gradually increasing Austrian state debt. Hungary’s state debt did 
not follow the typical path of  newcomers.36 It was able to forge benefit from 
its initial handicap via the integration of  the Dual Monarchy’s money markets, 
particularly after the adoption of  the Limping Gold Standard in 1892. The 
Hungarian money-market—through its close connection with the Wiener Börse 
34  Flandreau and Flores, “The Peaceful Conspiracy,” 220–29; López-Morell, The House of  Rothschild, 
361–64.
35  López-Morell, The House of  Rothschild, 191–213, 362–81.
36  Cf., Tomz, Reputation and International Cooperation, 39–69.
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and the Austo-Hungarian Bank—was able to gain admission to the “financial 
clique” at the forefront of  the international network. Without this affiliation, 
Hungary would have unlikely been able to emerge from its peripheral position.37
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